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THE SECURITY OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE
(The inter-war experience suggests that without controls on capital movements) ... “loose
funds may sweep round the world disorganizing all steady business” (John Maynard Keynes
‘The Post-War Currency Policy’, 8 ix 41 The Collected Writing of John Maynard Keynes,
Vol XXV ) 
1.  INTRODUCTION
1
Half a century after Keynes’ dictum, the security of international finance - the topic of this
lecture - has clearly become a cause for acute concern far beyond Wall Street and Canary
Wharf.   ‘Steady business’ - and thus the livelihoods of almost all the world’s population
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ranging from British pensioners to Indian peasants - is apparently threatened by the volatility
of paper assets, the very existence of which they are unaware. Daily news headlines tell us of
yet another financial crisis in some far-flung corner of the globe; while world leaders gathered
in Davos or Hong Kong seem to regard currency instability as the critical threat to western
civilization at the close of the twentieth century - in sharp contrast to the threat of socialist
revolution with which it opened.   
A significant and even symbolic characteristic of current global financial insecurity is the
uneasy combination of the speed and sophistication of computerized trading systems with the
faltering economies of ‘emerging markets’.  Sudden exchange rate collapses lead not only to
steep income declines for millions of poor people but also to major bank and stock market
losses in advanced industrial countries.   For the first time, economic events in the developing
world are affecting the financial security of developed countries.  The G7 has mobilized some
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US$ 300 billions as lender of last resort to major economies such as Mexico, Korea,
Indonesia, Russia and Brazil because of the threat to the international market system.    This
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concern reflects in turn the fact that although 28 advanced industrial countries still dominate
the international financial and trading system; 48 percent of global production and 55 percent
of world investment now takes place outside this group of rich countries.   Discussions on
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‘global financial architecture’ thus necessarily involve the two-fifths of the world population
living in countries who until recently were seen only as clients for development assistance. TheQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS23 Page 3
debate on the security of the international financial system thus extends beyond technical
economic issues to encounter problems derived from the problematic nature of globalization
itself.
In the first part of my lecture I shall try to explain the origins of inherent instability in
international capital flows, and why this requires public institutions to maintain an orderly
market. In the second part, I shall argue that despite widespread recognition of this problem,
the necessary institutions do not exist due to the mismatch between intergovernmental power
and the requirements of a global market. In the third and last part of the lecture I shall sketch
some of the implications of this dilemma for belief in the efficiency of markets, the
establishment of international property rights, and ultimately for global citizenship itself. 
2.  THE INHERENT INSTABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS
Sources of Systemic Volatility
Global capital markets are characterized by asymmetric and incomplete information derived
from the fact that all financial assets are promises to pay in an uncertain future. The increasing
international exposure of bank balance sheets and equity funds in industrial countries to the
financial systems in emerging market economies has not been accompanied by a corresponding
depth of information about the true value of the assets and liabilities. The speed and scale of
shock transmission between markets has increased enormously due to technological advances
in trading and settlement, which forces traders to act without knowledge of wider price
movements, exacerbating random fluctuations into serious instability. 
There are also substantial agency problems for bank lenders and portfolio investors. Unlike
multinational corporations involved in direct foreign investment, they can exercise little direct
control over the asset acquired and thus cannot protect its market value. To the extent that
banks and funds cannot count upon their own governments or the international financial
institutions to ensure payment of their loans or maintenance of asset value, their logical
response is to avoid assets which cannot be rapidly sold if things go wrong. QEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS23 Page 4
These information and agency problems explain the two main characteristics of so-called
‘portfolio’ investment in emerging markets. First, international portfolio investors and bank
lenders seek liquidity and use rapid exit as a means of containing downside risk by buying
quoted securities or rolling over short loans. In consequence, indicators such as the ‘quick
ratio’ of a country’s short-term foreign liabilities to central bank reserves become critical to
market stability, and can easily trigger self-fulfilling runs on a currency. Second, fund
managers control risk not by seeking more information or control, but by portfolio
diversification based on an assumed lack of covariance between emerging market indices. The
competition between funds for clients  drives them towards high-yield, high-risk assets; and by
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the same token obliges them to make frequent marginal adjustments to their  portfolios in
response not only to changes within these emerging markets but also in anticipation of what all
other fund managers are likely to do next.
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The effect of these behavioural characteristics is exacerbated by the way in which financial
markets clear. It is now well established in theory and practice that financial markets are in
permanent disequilibrium in the sense that demand for funds always exceeds supply at the
equilibrium interest rate.   In consequence, asset prices and interest prices do not fully reflect
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risk: lenders  use portfolio allocation rules - and thus rationing - to reduce uncertainty.
Domestic banks and securities firms are closely regulated to make sure they do this prudently
and always have sufficient collateral and adequate reserves.  In this way an ‘orderly market’ is
established.
In contrast, international investment flows - which often enjoy neither legal collateral nor
prudential regulation - react sharply to changing perceptions of country solvency rather than
to variations in underlying asset value. Even if information on the return (or risk) on a
particular asset can be acquired at a cost, the value of this knowledge declines as the
opportunities for diversification increase, so investors have no incentive to search for
information. Herding behaviour becomes endemic as the observed asset prices, exchange rates
and reserve levels send the same signal to all participants but they all attempt to anticipate the
same trend in order to make a capital gain.QEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS23 Page 5
Emerging market assets form a relatively small part of savers’ portfolios in developed
countries, but a large part of firms’ and banks’ liabilities in developing countries. Because of
this asymmetry between borrowers and lenders,  marginal shifts in lenders’ positions tend to
destabilize borrowers.  These surges are then worsened by herding behaviour because as
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opportunities for diversification increase the impact of news on the allocation of funds in a
single country relative to initial allocations grows without bounds, resulting in a massive flows
further threatening financial stability.
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Why the security of international finance matters
The international financial system is vulnerable to emerging market volatility; rather like
banking in the US and the UK in the nineteenth century, when huge fluctuations in the real
economy were associated with banking booms and busts.  . There is often a high degree of
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leverage in short term flows; banks making loans to hedge funds and similar intermediaries
based in largely unregulated offshore international banking markets. In other cases they are
on-selling risky securities to their clients; or extending short-term loans which are renewed
every six months. Banks and other financial intermediaries have financial assets far larger than
their own capital, so that the loss of only a small part of their loans threatens their survival.
This is why they are restricted in the loans they can make by regulators. In consequence, when
such losses do occur, they must sell other assets in order to recover the liquidity necessary to
maintain their own capital. This exacerbates market fluctuations, leading to collapses more
rapid and more deep than the preceding boom, for two reasons.
The first is a process known as ‘rolling margin calls’ where other assets (many of which are
not owned, but rather obligations or options to buy or sell at some future date) have to be
quickly sold, depressing their price and forcing other investors to sell further assets and so on.
Thus the selling wave moves through the market far more rapidly than the original buying
surge. When this results in a reduction of credit to firms in the ‘real’ economy, firms which
have relied on the renewal of bank credit to finance operations are forced into bankruptcy.
The second reason is the effect that losses have upon the reputation of banks and funds, in a
process known as ‘contagion’. In the absence of reliable information as to the value of theQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS23 Page 6
assets held by a particular bank or fund, depositors withdraw their funds rapidly from this and
related institutions - thus bringing about the very situation they fear and panic spreads -
affecting firms in the same sector or country indiscriminately independently of their solvency.
It this situation which usually obliges central banks to intervene by supplying sufficient
liquidity for banks to meet their short-term obligations without becoming bankrupt. 
Financial markets are thus inherently unstable, which is why at a domestic level they are so
closely regulated. At the international level, it is precisely at the interstices between regulatory
authorities that the largest short-term profits are to be made and the greatest risks of systemic
collapse are to be found.   Emerging markets are particularly vulnerable  to this instability,
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not only because they have weak and inexperienced financial regulators.  
Developing countries have shallow and narrow capital markets, where relatively small flows of
foreign capital can have a large effect on prices, particularly those of government bonds and
privatization issues which tend to make up the bulk of traded securities. Their firms tend to be
highly geared and dependent on borrowed funds, so that credit restrictions have a
disproportionate effect upon production. Their populations in turn are vulnerable because
much of their population lives near the poverty line, unprotected by modern welfare systems;
so that macroeconomic fluctuations - particularly large deteriorations in the exchange rate -
can have serious social consequences.
Despite this vulnerability, rapid financial liberalization has been pressed by both international
agencies and local modernizing elites in emerging market countries. As a result, large
international liabilities have been built up by the private firms and households to finance both
investment and consumption. The currency risk was perceived as low by foreign lenders due
to the strong growth record and nominal exchange rate stability underpinned by the same
capital inflows.
The volatility of short-term capital flows (or ‘capital surges’) is now recognized as a major
problem for macroeconomic management in developing countries; which subsequently
translates into investment, growth, employment and welfare.   Government expenditure 
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cannot be efficiently allocated to the satisfaction of social priorities when both the borrowing
ability and the cost of funds varies so sharply.  The impact of  short flows on output and
15
investment by firms through the availability of bank credit is also large, reducing private
investment. Employment levels and real wage rates are affected by the influence of capital
surges on real exchange rates and domestic demand levels.
Missing institutions
In response to these problems, special institutional arrangements have emerged historically in
industrial countries as part of the process of constructing orderly financial markets.  It would
seem logical, therefore, to expect that an orderly global capital market would require similar
institutions at an intergovernmental level. 
These would be four:
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first the core central banking functions of providing liquidity to the market, including
last-resort lending under distress conditions in order to support otherwise sound banks
and prevent contagion; this is the putative function of the IMF - although it at present
has insufficient funds and is only empowered to lend to governments (or their central
banks) and cannot deal directly with global or local private banks;
second, the prudential regulation of financial intermediaries, in order to prevent not
only fraud but also unsafe lending with wider consequences; to some extent this
service is provided by the Bank for International Settlements, but it leaves the greater
part of global financial intermediaries still unregulated;
third, the existence of private financial institutions (‘market makers’) who stand ready
to buy and sell assets at the current price - creating ‘depth’ and thus stability in the
market - and to take over insolvent financial intermediaries when necessary; such
cooperation is notable by its absence - particularly in international rescue operations;  QEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS23 Page 8
fourth, and possibly most significantly, a sound and transparent legal system that
secures contracts and provides for efficient dispute settlement between contracting
parties and between financial intermediaries and the regulators; such a ‘multilateral
framework for investment’ which could stabilize expectations and thus asset values
does not yet exist.
3.  THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GLOBAL FINANCIAL REFORM
The Effectiveness of International Financial Institutions 
The existing international institutional ‘architecture’ to cope with these problems in emerging
markets is based on the agencies founded at Bretton Woods in 1944; the International
Monetary Fund in particular. As intergovernmental institutions, the IFIs are essentially lenders
of last resort, against which facility they can impose policy conditionality designed to restore
long-term solvency in return for the provision of liquidity.  Whatever the effectiveness of this
approach in the sovereign debt crises of the 1980s, or to the chronic economic problems of the
least developed countries, it is not appropriate for the emerging market crises of the 1990s.
The recent Latin American and East Asian crises are essentially related to private sector asset
deflation and illiquidity, not state failure.
The root causes of the breakdown were not prevented (and possibly have been exacerbated)
by Bretton Woods policies of accelerated financial liberalization, exchange rate anchoring and
encouragement of private portfolio investment as a substitute for sovereign borrowing.  The
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IFIs appear to have taken the pre-crisis position that because the external deficits reflect 
private investment-savings gaps rather than fiscal deficits, they must reflect rational market
decisions and thus be respected. However, even had they wished to prevent such inflows, their
ex-ante influence over lenders is limited to issuing negative macroeconomic evaluations with
the consequent danger of market collapse.   
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Ex-post, their insistence on large devaluations, high interest rates, credit restrictions and fiscal
retrenchment have tended to further undermine both corporations and bank, worsening the
crises they attempt to resolve. The failure of recent IMF interventions in East Asia and MexicoQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS23 Page 9
essentially derive from the failure to recognize and correct private debt problems. In the
commercial world, of course, insolvent companies are placed under new management and the
unserviceable debt is written off by the creditors. There is, however no equivalent in
international debt crises.  
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Of course, global surveillance is not only carried out by the IFIs. In principle, if the issue were
one of information as such, the ratings agency should be able to invest in better information on
country risk than any one investor and then provide what is effectively a public good for a
modest fee.  However, the failure of the leading private ratings agencies to predict collapse in
Mexico and East Asia is notorious.  The way in which information is used by ratings agencies
seems to be deficient - an issue of economic interpretation rather than economic statistics.  
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There are various reasons for this, including the methodology used to construct ratings (which
is largely backward- rather than forward-looking) and the natural desire not to destabilize
already fragile markets.  
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One of the key reasons for the volatility of capital flows is doubts about the solvency of
particular developing countries.  The existence of a large international public debt overhang
represents a major constraint on further long-term foreign investment on any significant scale -
due to the uncertainty caused by the prospect of severe stabilization measures in order to meet
debt service, or the sovereign risk inherent in debt default. This debt overhang is also a major
disincentive to private domestic investors, for the same reason.
In effect, the process of financial intervention in developing countries by the Bretton Woods
institutions has led to the transfer of sovereign debt from commercial creditors to the IFIs
themselves. Once so refinanced, it has become almost impossible to write off. The main reason
given for not cancelling this debt is one of ‘moral hazard’   - the belief that if developing
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country sovereign debt is cancelled, then their governments - freed from the external
constraint - will return to ‘irresponsible’ policies. Unfortunately, the current HIPC initiative
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is both insufficient in scale and too lengthy in process to make a substantive contribution to
the reduction of investor uncertainty.  QEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS23 Page 10
Global Financial Architecture
The recurrent financial crises since Mexico in 1995 have naturally tested policy makers’
enthusiasm for deregulation; but no lasting lessons were drawn from Mexico: it was only the
East Asian collapse of 1997 followed by the Russian and Brazilian collapses of 1998 that
forced discussion of institutional reform. All four required the US Treasury to engage in large
support operations  through the IMF with somewhat reluctant assistance from Europe and
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Japan and without the consent of Congress. Indeed, Republican legislators remain
unconvinced of the need to strengthen the capacity of the IMF to intervene in such crises,
believing that losses should be fully borne by investors. It can be argued that it was only the
collapse of Long Term Capital Management and its bailout by the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York in order to prevent systemic collapse of Wall Street, that finally made the case for
reform.  
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It is generally agreed that reform is needed but there is little evidence of tangible progress.
One problem is the lack of a clear idea as to what to do; but more crucial is the unwillingness
of major states to act together. Even a minimal measure such as restoring the previous reserve
requirements on international bank lending and doing so effectively would require concerted
G10 action and vigilance of offshore operations. However, the US financial services industry
has sufficient lobbying strength to block even this limited measure. Indeed similar supervision
is required to combat the narcotics trade and has not yet been implemented.
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The two proposals on the table at present are relatively timid and yet the source of
considerable disagreement:
The ‘G22 proposal’ supported by Washington, is for the ad hoc grouping of leading
industrial and emerging market countries convened by the US Treasury for the first
time in 1998 to become more formalized. This is the only existing forum containing
financial authorities from both developed and developing counties. The idea is to both
strengthen financial supervision in emerging markets and maintain US control of the
process.  Washington believes that Europe is over-represented in the G7, the G10 and
even the IMF; although abolition or restructuring of the IMF seems unlikely.QEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS23 Page 11
The UK proposal is for an international standing committee of the IMF, the World
Bank, Bank for International Settlements and key national regulators to monitor
international capital markets and report on the cross-border activities of major financial
institutions. Supervisory authority would remain with national regulators, but the
standing committee would ensure exchange of information; their work would be based
on the Basle Committee’s ‘Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision’, and the
IMF’s ‘Framework for Financial Stability’ which is derived from it.  
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None the less, regulators in industrial countries are responding to the increasing consolidation
of the financial services sector itself.  In the US cross-sectoral mergers are accelerating in
anticipation of the repeal of legislation which prohibits linkages between banks and securities
houses and insurance companies.   Trans-border banking consolidation in Europe is being
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accelerated by the introduction of the Euro and thus riskless cross-border transactions. The
ECB may be forced to take a more active part in bank regulation and act as lender of last
resort like the Federal Reserve.  
Finally, the reinstatement of capital controls are being reconsidered by a number of emerging
market governments in the wake of the East Asian crisis.   Although administrative controls
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are unlikely to return, financial liberalization is likely to be much more cautious in future.
Taxes and reserve requirements on short-term capital flows based on the Chilean model are
likely to become more common; while greater emphasis will be placed on encouraging FDI as
a more stable form of external finance.  
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Triad Coordination
The provision of an orderly international capital market clearly requires not only improved
banking regulation but also a reasonable degree of coordination between the three major
currencies in order to reduce uncertainty and encourage longer-term lending.  Indeed this was 
the aim - and achievement - of the post-War ‘Bretton Woods System’, although this was
based on the US dollar as a single world currency. QEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS23 Page 12
After the successful launch of the Euro, the dollar is no longer the only key trading and asset
currency. Moreover, encouraged by this opening, the Japanese government is pressing for a
currency grid system between the three currencies, supported by their respective central banks.
In addition the Hong Kong Monetary Authority has suggested that an ‘Asian monetary area’
be established with cross asset holdings by central banks in the region (rather than holding
reserves in dollar assets) and eventually a common currency for trading purposes. These
notions are strongly opposed by Washington which fears the decline of the dollar as the
leading world currency. 
Moreover, the Federal Reserve is tasked to maintain low inflation and steady economic
expansion in the United States. It is not responsible for the parity of the dollar, and traditional
policy has been one of ‘benign neglect’ of the exchange rate. On the one hand, international
financial affairs are the concern of the US Treasury. Indeed finance has become the principal
instrument of US foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. On the other hand, Congress is
wary of international monetary commitments, and has effectively prevented monetary
coordination even with Canada and Mexico within the NAFTA - despite this being one of the
contributory causes of the Mexican crisis in 1995.
The European Central Bank has an even narrower brief - to maintain low rates of inflation.
Frankfurt has no responsibility for euro parity, and there is no provision for a central treasury
function in Brussels either. Although there is every expectation that the euro will steadily
strengthen against the dollar, this is not the result of a considered policy but rather due to
demand for the euro as a reserve currency and the growing US trade deficit.  The Bank of
Japan is subject to the Ministry of Finance, which does attempt to intervene to stabilize the
yen, but its effective powers are limited by the domestic banking crisis and thus the need to
keep its own banks solvent and accommodate the reflationary fiscal initiatives of the
government. 
These are more than conjunctural limitations. In the case of the Federal Reserve and the 
European Central Bank they derive from a political axiom that monetary policy should be
removed from elected governments and entrusted to ‘independent experts’ with strictly limitedQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS23 Page 13
responsibilities. In addition, the difficulty of coordinating three asynchronous economic cycles
is often given as a reason why nothing further can be done; despite the successful experience
of the Bretton Woods system in the 1950s and 1960s.
This stalemate can be characterized in two ways. On the one hand, it can be regarded as a
classic problem of collective action, where there is a need for pooled sovereignty in order to
increase the welfare of all three participants - and by extension the rest of the world.   Failure
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to agree essentially reflects misguided nationalism and a ‘lack of leadership’ in this
explanation. On the other hand the stalemate can be seen as a classic problem in international
relations, with the declining hegemon - that is, the US driven by strategic objectives and bank
lobbyists - unwilling to cede global economic dominance to rising regional powers.  
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Meanwhile, international financial crises will probably become more frequent. 
4.  FINANCIAL SECURITY, MARKET RATIONALITY AND GLOBAL DEMOCRACY
The Rationality of Markets
Global policymakers share the orthodox doctrine that the liberalization of trade and investment
will increase efficiency, raise human productivity and eventually eliminate world poverty.   In
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political terms this has been reinforced by the widespread belief that governments are
inherently self-seeking and inefficient, or at best hostages to populist pressures from their
electorates. In contrast, markets provide a superior and in some sense more equitable
rationality upon which social organization can be based. This view of the market as an
objective standard is not fully shared by business people even though they naturally prefer as
few regulatory restrictions as possible,  but it is a doctrine which appears to be received
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wisdom for most senior politicians and civil servants. 
This has a number of corollaries. One is the tendency to entrust economic management to
‘independent’ and ‘technical’ bodies such as autonomous central banks,  independent of the
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control of the legislature or elected government. The fact that such institutions inevitably
derive their autonomy as much from their coalition with leading banks (or in the case of
emerging markets, multilateral agencies) as from their constitutional mandates is oftenQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS23 Page 14
overlooked. Another such corollary is the frequent argument that ‘there is no alternative’
(TINA) to conservative economic policies such as welfare restrictions and employment
flexibility at the national level because acceptable standards of conduct are set by international
capital markets. Any other policy will be ‘punished’ by capital flight.  
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In consequence, to admit that international capital markets are inherently unstable - as I have
been arguing explicitly and the proposals for a new financial architecture do implicitly - is to
undermine a central political doctrine which is not confined to the realm of ideas moreover.
The shift away from occupational and state pension funds on the one hand, and away from
bank deposits and fixed-rate mortgages on the other, towards greater involvement of ordinary
households (and voters) in financial markets also has profound political implications. The
exposure of voters’ sense of well-being to financial asset values (the ‘wealth effect’) has
obvious benefits when stock markets are booming and interest rates are low; but any reversal
(despite the small print) has equivalent political costs. 
In the specific context of the security of internal finance, the neo-liberal trend has been
reflected in the gradual move of regulatory practice away from the traditional prescriptive
approach based on rules and prohibitions towards designing incentives for private financial
institutions to behave in socially optimal ways. After determined lobbying from international
banks, ‘risk modelling’ has been permitted by regulators in order to determine the capital
reserve requirements of banks. As a result of the 1996 modification to the Basle Capital
Accord, leading securities authorities announced in May 1998 that IOSCO members could
permit the use of statistical models for regulatory purposes.  However, these models have
performed so poorly in the recent financial turmoil that it has become clear that the
assumptions upon which these models were based were incompatible with extreme market
stress. 
This has revealed a fundamental problem in the dominant view of market rationality. While it
is clear that asset markets are volatile by their nature, banks argued that the volatility involved
could be estimated from past performance and certain ‘fundamentals’.  The measurable risk
involved could be priced (in much the same ways as insurance premiums are calculated fromQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS23 Page 15
actuarial tables) and compared to the yield on a safe asset (such as US Treasury Bills) in a
portfolio constructed so as to offset the risk in one asset against another. However, this was to
confuse risk with uncertainty and it is now clear that future outcomes were not effectively
priced into asset values - which reflect subjective enthusiasms (and fears) rather than rational
expectations of a predictable outcomes.  
The problem has been worsened by a lack of clarity as to what ‘fundamentals’ actually are.
Once gross fiscal imbalances have been overcome and market deregulation is under way; the
main indicators can become confusing signals for investors. Thus large current account deficits
are seen by some as a sign of success in attracting foreign investment and by other as a sign of
an overvalued currency; while growing corporate foreign debt is seen by some to reflect
efficient financial diversification, and by others as dangerous exchange rate exposure by
unhedged corporate treasurers. 
This means that the notion that markets would be more stable if more information were
available is probably misguided. If the way in which probabilities should be constructed from
available data is in doubt, then more data will not necessarily help and may even confuse.
Unlike risk, uncertainty cannot be insured against and arguably is the main reason why
institutions exist in the first place. Thus, despite the neo-liberal paradigm still being firmly
entrenched, it is not surprising that there is a discernable change of mood back towards a
desire for stronger international market rules, even in some business circles.   
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Global Property Rules
Although over the past decade all countries have embarked on an unprecedented liberalization
of their financial regimes, international investment agreements - such as bilateral investment
treaties, double taxation treaties, regional trade agreements and certain WTO provisions have
all multiplied. These trends reflect a move away from national rights to control foreign
investment and norms for corporate conduct; and play key role in building investor confidence
by locking in policy commitments over time.  They are usually based on general standards of
38
treatment; coupled with norms on specific matters such as expropriation, compensation and
the transfer of funds, as well as mechanisms for the international settlement of disputes.QEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS23 Page 16
In consequence, the twenty-nine OECD members launched negotiations in 1995 on the
world’s first multilateral agreement establishing comprehensive and binding rules for
investment providing market access, legal security and a ‘level playing field’ for international
investment flows.    Negotiation was between OECD members only although the Multilateral
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Agreement on Investment was intended to be eventually open to accession by non-member
countries who could reach the required regulatory standards. 
This non-inclusive negotiating format had a precedent in the early GATT rounds, but it was
clearly a fundamental weakness insofar as emerging market interests could not be directly
reflected. Moreover, a number of non-governmental organizations became concerned by the
apparent exclusion of strict safeguards on labour standards and environmental protection from
the MAI. None the less, the eventual breakdown of the Paris negotiations in 1998 arose from
the nature of the exceptions claimed by OECD members (particularly the USA and France)
rather than the development issue as such.  
It now appears that negotiations on a ‘Multilateral Framework for Investment’ will be
transferred to Geneva this year, not least because of the many investment-related trade issues
already built into the WTO framework.  France, Canada and the United Kingdom all support
this approach, and the European Commission has included investment in its proposed list of
agenda items for the comprehensive ‘Millennium Round’ of multilateral trade talks which it
wants to see launched in 1999. 
Effective multilateral taxation of corporate profits and asset incomes has also become a topic
of increasing concern to industrial countries.  There are current moves towards tax
harmonization and establish withholding taxes in the EU order to reduce the tax loss on the
profits generated there. In order to strengthen this process of fiscal capture, it will become
necessary to eliminate tax havens - or at the very least deny the benefits of international
investor protection to firms registered there. Such an agreement would not only improve the
fiscal revenues participating countries  but would also strengthen the effort to combat money
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laundering and financial fraud - again, stabilizing financial flows.
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If such a multilateral tax treaty were to include developing countries it would confer a number
of advantages. First, it would prevent wasteful tax competition between developing countries
in order to attract foreign investors. Second, as all tax paid in developing countries is
deductable against tax liability in (developed) home countries, increased effectiveness in tax
collection by developing countries would be a net transfer between the treasuries of home and
host country - far more effective than the present system of development assistance. Third,
this would provide a stable source of long-term funding for the public investment in education,
health and infrastructure that developing countries require. Fourth, it would permit effective
taxation of their own nationals with considerable overseas assets; and reverse the trend
towards national tax systems being forced to taxation their main immobile factor of production
- labour. 
Such an approach would be superior to proposals for a so-called ‘Tobin’ tax on short-term
financial transactions.   Such a turnover tax would have little effect on speculative flows,
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because at any feasible rate it would imply a penalty of marginal importance compared to the
prospective losses from maintaining asset holdings in a currency under attack. In addition the
Tobin tax would be impossible to collect in view of the complexity, speed and substitutability
of cross border currency transactions - leaving aside the problem of offshore transactions. 
In contrast, multilateral corporate taxation can be based on the statutory requirement to
present accounts in some jurisdiction, and only requires the effective coordination of the vast
web of existing bilateral tax treaties. It would also deliver resources to developing country
governments rather than to an international body and not require - in principle - a new
international bureaucracy to administer it. 
Global Citizenship?
The difficulty in establishing international rules as the basis for global financial security
underlines the fact that no system of international commercial law exists. There does exist a
system of international public law which regulates - albeit under some strain at times - the
relations between states.   However there is no equivalent in the fields of trade and
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investment, beyond the treaty obligations of governments under - say - the World Trade
Organization. 
In consequence, international commercial cases are arbitrated either in the national jurisdiction
of the contracting parties’ choice  or at private tribunals.  Indeed the only persons
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traditionally recognized under international law are pirates, and more recently perpetrators of
genocide. The right of foreign investors to make claims against states on their own behalf has,
however, been established recently for the first time in a major plurilateral treaty in the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); a precedent which generated considerable
disquiet when it was included in the draft of the MAI.
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The recognition of firms (‘juridical persons’) in international law as the basis for international
property rights, would have considerable implications for global citizenship - although what
these implications might be is far from clear. Many critics of globalization would argue that
the consequences of such a development would be to further strengthen the hand of
multinational corporations free to move around the world and hold governments to ransom, as
against local labour forces confined to their national territory and forced to reduce wages and
work conditions in order to find employment.  
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This would seem to me to be an argument for stricter international regulation of investment,
rather than attempts at national withdrawal from the global economy. Equitable negotiations
of international investment and taxation rules, along the lines discussed above, would seem to
be a first step towards this. What is more, the recognition of firms under international law
would make the recognition of persons almost inevitable - thus strengthening the subsequent
development of international human rights. A historical precedent is the way in which property
rights formed the basis for civil law in England, and subsequently for civil and thus human
rights.
It is true that the growing mobility of capital contrasts markedly with the increasing immobility
of labour .  However, this would reflect a serious challenge to the notion of citizenship even if
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an irreproachable manner. As modern economic theory has shown, it is not just financial
capital, management skills, modern technology and skilled labour - all of which are
internationally mobile in principle - which determine productivity growth and living standards
at the national level. Rather it is the ‘social overhead capital’ of infrastructure, institutions and
even culture which account for the larger part of international income differences. 
These common assets are built up historically through social investment (and tax payments) of
previous generations, and thus are specific to nations (or cities) and not internationally mobile. 
This form of capital is ‘owned’ by the nationals of the country in question; and is essence
means that their passport is the principal asset which citizens of rich countries possess. Their
incomes depend upon the ‘dividend’ from joint ownership of their country’s social overhead
capital - an equity which they mainly inherit through birth and deny to other members of the
global community by prohibiting immigration.   
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In the strict sense of liberal political philosophy set out by Rawls, this arrangement is clearly
unjust. All parents in poor countries would doubtless prefer that their children be born citizens
of a rich nation, independently wherever they were to eventually reside.  Once behind the ‘veil
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of ignorance’ and not knowing which passport their children would receive in a lottery system,
future parents from both poor and rich countries would logically vote for the free movement
of labour around the globe. In Rawls’ rigorous sense, the ‘indifference test’ demonstrates that
the current situation is manifestly unfair and unacceptable.  
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It can be argued, of course, that the citizens of individual countries do not belong to a single
political community and can only be represented internationally by their respective states. This
is a realistic interpretation, but leads logically towards more equitable representation in
international organizations charged with the regulation of the international economic system.
Specifically, this implies that the United Nations should be the forum in which investment
issues are settled through the equal representation of states,  or possibly by the creation of an
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‘economic security council’ reflecting regional economic interests.   
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None the less, it is worth considering the implications for the Hegelian moral imperative of the
debates on international financial security outlined in this lecture, however hypothetical these
may be. All human beings are already members of a single political community by virtue of
their participation in a global market; a participation in which they were not consulted.  If
financial assets become internationally recognized as they must be if they are to be effectively
regulated, and if a multilateral property (and tax) system emerges, then this eventually means
the recognition of natural persons as subjects of international law. Finally, such recognition
opens the door to the redistribution of the global income from capital towards the labouring
poor and the eventual elimination of global poverty in the form of social transfers rather than
‘aid’ in the twenty-first century in much the same way in which social citizenship replaced
charity in modern Europe during the twentieth.  
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5. CONCLUSIONS
In less than an hour I have leapt somewhat unsteadily from economic theory to political
economy and then on towards political philosophy - a somewhat perilous inter-disciplinary
expedition which I trust has been worthwhile.
To recap, my three main points have been:
first, financial markets are inherently unstable because they deal in expectations; they
require strong regulation to underpin contracts and prevent systemic collapse; so that
global financial markets require global regulation - not as a means of protecting
consumers or small investors, but just so that they can function at all; the consequences
of this instability - particularly for the three-quarters of the world population outside
the OECD; 
second, it has taken repeated international crises to convince global policymakers that
the Bretton Woods Institutions are wholly inadequate to provide the required
international security; but the implementation of the required regulatory framework
faces the opposition of both the major global economic power and private financialQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS23 Page 21
intermediaries; resolution of this impasse may only come about through the
geopolitical balance between new currency areas;
third, the process by which a new inter-governmental financial architecture is
established will be slow and driven by successive crises; but it will entail a more critical
approach to markets ‘rationality’ as a substitute for political process, to the nature of
international property rights, and possibly ultimately towards the concept of global
citizenship itself. 
My argument has thus not been against global financial integration - which in any event is an
inevitable trend - but rather a case for the construction of an appropriate international
framework which an orderly market requires. The construction of that framework will be slow
and driven by national interest, but I believe that it just might contain an opportunity for global
emancipation. QEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS23 Page 22
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